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B eauty,	 like	 most	 philosophically	 gripping	 phenomena,	 has	its	fanatics.	Claims	for	it	(and	against	it)	often	seem	overblown	or	 grandiose,	 attributing	 to	 beauty	 a	 kind	 of	mystical	 or	 reli-
gious	 import,	 or	 saying,	with	Plato,	 that	 contemplation	of	beauty	 is	
what	 ultimately	 makes	 life	 worth	 living.1	 G.E.	 Moore	 claims	 at	 the	
end	of	Principia Ethica	that	“…personal	affections	and	aesthetic	enjoy-
ments	 include	all the	greatest,	and	by far	 the	greatest,	goods	we	can	
imagine…”	and	calls	this	“the	ultimate	and	fundamental	truth	of	Moral	
Philosophy.”2	Friedrich	Schiller	tells	us,	amazingly,	“It	is	only	through	
Beauty	 that	man	makes	his	way	 to	 Freedom.”3 Only	 through	beauty.	
Such	claims	are	as	strange	to	contemporary	philosophical	ears	as	they	
are	common	in	the	history	of	philosophy.4
It	is	tempting	to	ignore	or	dismiss	such	grand	claims,	or	to	react	by	
pouring	cold	water	on	the	theory	of	beauty.	Extreme	subjectivism	in,	
or	outright	dismissal	of,	the	theory	of beauty	can	seem	attractive	not	
just	because	the	experience	of	beauty	can	be	so	personal	or	give	rise	to	
so	much	disagreement,	but	also	because	it	might	seem	too	strange	or	
implausible	to	give	beauty	the	kind	of	weight	that	philosophers	were	
once	so	eager	 to	give	 it	—	as	 if	only	blanket	dismissal	could	provide	
enough	distance	 from	such	an	awkward	past.	Necessity,	 truth,	 ratio-
nality,	 morality:	 they	 merit	 the	 enthusiastic	 attention	 they	 receive;	
beauty’s	fanatics,	in	contrast,	are	a	little	odd.
1.	 See	Plato’s	Symposium;	see	also	Alexander	Nehamas’s	“‘Only	in	the	Contem-
plation	of	Beauty	is	Human	Life	Worth	Living’	Plato,	Symposium	211d”,	in	Eu-
ropean Journal of Philosophy,	Vol.	15,	No.	1,	pp.	1–18,	April	2007.
2.	 Principia Ethica,	Chapter	6,	passage	113.	Moore	also	calls	beauty	the	“raison	
d’être	of	virtue”,	which	forms,	along	with	personal	affections	“…the	rational	
ultimate	end	of	human	action	and	the	sole	criterion	of	social	progress…”.
3.	 “…if	man	is	ever	to	solve	that	problem	of	politics	in	practice	he	will	have	to	
approach	it	through	the	problem	of	the	aesthetic,	because	it	is	only	through	
Beauty	that	man	makes	his	way	to	Freedom”,	On the Aesthetic Education of Man,	
second	letter,	§5.	See	also	the	twenty-third	letter.
4.	 Here	 are	 two	 other	 apparently	 similar	 remarks:	Wittgenstein	 in	 the	Tracta-
tus (6.421):	 “Ethics	 and	aesthetics	 are	one	and	 the	 same.”	Nietzsche	 in	 the	
The Birth of Tragedy:	“…only	as	an	aesthetic phenomenon	are	existence	and	the	
world	justified	to	eternity”.
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belongs	in	his	taxonomy.	Why	shouldn’t	we	expect	a	theory	of	beauty	
to	explain	how,	sometimes,	it	“inspires	us,	ennobles	us,	summons	us	
to	transcendence”,	if	it	does?
The	passage	from	Levinson	suggests	an	answer.	His	thought	is	that	
the	Platonic	tradition	“makes	of”	beauty	a	“richer	affair”.	Some	might	
think	that	sometimes	beauty	is	“ennobling”.	But	really,	the	thought	is,	
beauty	isn’t	very	profound.	Certain	philosophers	exaggerate	it,	inflate	
it,	put	icing	on	a	lump	of	earth	that	might,	in	some	conditions	of	recep-
tion,	look	like	a	cake.	But	whether	this	is	right	depends,	at	the	very	least,	
on	whether	we	even	understand	why	a	philosopher	would	be	tempted	
to	construe	beauty	as	Plato,	Moore,	and	others	have.	And	it	is	not	clear	
whether	the	theory	of	beauty	has	achieved	such	understanding.
It	 is	one	 thing	 to	 think	 that	we	shouldn’t	 take	such	cases	as	our	
philosophical	 starting	 point,	 and	 quite	 another	 to	 think	 that	 we	
should	ignore	them	altogether.	One	might	reasonably	think	that	the	
theory	of	beauty	shouldn’t	begin	with	what	might	turn	out	to	be	ex-
aggerated	claims	 from	beauty’s	PR	department.	But	 that	 reasonable	
view	is	compatible	with	there	being	a	demand	that	beauty’s	apparent	
profundity,	or	the	temptation	to	emphasize	it,	be	either	explained	or	
explained	away.
And	the	thing	is,	I’m	kind	of	a	fanatic.	I’m	easily	dazzled	by	claims	
like	Schiller’s,	Moore’s,	and	Plato’s	and	want	 to	understand	whether,	
and	if	so	how,	beauty	might	have	the	kind	of	significance	philosophers	
have	attributed	to	it.	Maybe	that	reveals	some	failing	or	defect	on	my	
part,	but	a	study	of	contemporary	philosophical	aesthetics	does	little	
to	set	me	straight.	The	mainstream	picture	of	aesthetic	value	and	of	
the	point	of	aesthetic	life	gives	us	almost	no	grip	on	how	or	even	why	
beauty	should	have	been	thought	to	be	so	philosophically	important.
The	main	problem	seems	to	be	what	is	arguably	the	most	influential	
idea	about	beauty,	namely,	that	it	essentially	involves	a	kind	of	affec-
tive	response	that	philosophers	call	“disinterested	pleasure”.	The	idea	
is	classically	expressed	in	Immanuel	Kant’s	Critique of the Power of Judg-
ment;	it	had	a	major	influence	on	nineteenth-	and	twentieth-century	
Unsurprisingly,	then,	grand	claims	for	beauty	are	largely	ignored	or	
regarded	with	skepticism	in	contemporary	philosophy	—	even	in	the	
Cinderella	subfield	of	aesthetics,	where,	 if	beauty	 is	discussed	at	all,	
many	philosophers	are	eager	to	focus	on	a	more	“earthbound”	notion.5 
In	 some	cases,	 the	 thought	 that	beauty	 is,	 or	 could	be,	profound	 in	
some	way	is	explicitly	set	aside	as	parochial,	idiosyncratic,	or	just	too	
obscure.	Near	 the	beginning	of	 Jerrold	Levinson’s	 recent	account	of	
visual	beauty,	for	example,	he	writes,
Before	 proceeding,	 though,	 I	must	 briefly	 acknowledge	
another	 tradition	 of	 theorizing	 beauty,	 initiated	 by	 Pla-
to,	 that	makes	of	 it	a	richer	affair,	or	sets	 for	 it	a	higher	
standard.	This	is	a	tradition	according	to	which	beauty	is	
not	 simply	 that	which	 gives	 us	 pleasure	 to	 behold,	 but	
rather	that	which	inspires	us,	ennobles	us,	summons	us	
to	transcendence….
My	view	is	that,	although	this	is	a	power	or	an	effect	
of	some	beautiful	objects,	of	certain	sorts,	in	some	condi-
tions	of	reception,	it	does	not	characterize	all	such	objects	
or	occasions	of	beholding.6
Levinson	apparently	offers	this	as	a	reason	not	to	discuss	this	dimen-
sion	of	beauty.	It	doesn’t	come	up	again	in	his	account,	even	though	
his	 thesis	 is	 that	 “beauty	 is	 not	 one”.	He	proceeds	 to	offer	 a	 careful	
taxonomy	of	 species	 of	 visual	 beauty,	 including,	 among	others,	 nat-
ural	 beauty,	 human	beauty,	 formal	 beauty,	 and	 abstract	 beauty	—	all	
of	 which	 characterize	 “some	 beautiful	 objects,	 of	 certain	 sorts,	 in	
some	conditions	of	reception”,	but	not	“all	such	objects	or	occasions	
of	beholding”.	 For	 all	 Levinson	has	 said,	 there	 is	 another	 species	of	
beauty	—	ennobling,	 or	 self-transcending,	 or	 inspiring	 beauty	—	that	
5.	 See	 Jerrold	 Levinson’s	 “Beauty	 is	 Not	 One:	 The	 Irreducible	 Variety	 of	 Vi-
sual	Beauty”,	 in	The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology,	eds.	Elisabeth	
Schellekens	and	Peter	Goldie,	Oxford	University	Press,	2012,	pp.	190–207.
6.	 Ibid.,	p.	192.
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the	item	and	not	by	the	way	the	item	“answers	to	one’s	individual	de-
sires,	needs,	or	worldly	projects”.8	Both	quoted	phrases	are	intolerably	
vague,	but	the	latter	is	especially	so,	given	the	focus	of	this	essay.	Their	
vagueness	also	speaks	in	favor	of	expressing	only	the	necessary	condi-
tion	and	not	also	the	sufficient	condition.	For	all	their	(lack	of)	speci-
ficity,	there	may	be	pleasures	that	satisfy	them	but	that	aren’t	aesthetic.	
I	don’t	know	whether	the	pleasing	calm	one	may	find	in	concentrat-
ing	single-mindedly	on	an	object	or	process	(like	the	rise	and	fall	of	
one’s	breath)	 is	aesthetic,	but	 it	does	satisfy	a	natural	reading	of	the	
two	phrases.	Furthermore,	note	that	Disinterest-	and	+	leave	open	the	
types	of	objects	that	can	merit	this	pleasure.	For	all	they	say,	we	can	
take	aesthetic	pleasure	in	objects	of	perception	—	looks,	feels,	sounds,	
etc.	—	and	objects	of	pure	contemplation	or	imagination	—	novels,	po-
ems,	mathematical	objects,	and	the	like.
Both	Disinterest-	and	+	are	expressed	in	a	variety	of	works	in	aes-
thetics,	new	and	old.	 In	a	 famous	statement	of	 “aesthetic	 formalism”,	
Clive	Bell	seems	to	endorse	a	strong	form	of	the	negative	condition:	
“[T]o	appreciate	a	work	of	art	we	need	bring	with	us	nothing	from	life,	
no	knowledge	of	its	ideas	and	affairs,	no	familiarity	with	its	emotions.”9 
According	to	Bell,	artistic	appreciation	requires	nothing	“from	life”,	so	
the	pleasure	 it	 involves	cannot	be	due	to	 the	satisfaction	of	our	“de-
sires,	needs,	or	worldly	projects”.	Bell	is	part	of	a	tradition	that	consid-
ers	art	to	be	the	paradigmatic	object	of	aesthetic	pleasure	—	so,	on	this	
view,	aesthetic	pleasure	conforms	to	Disinterest-.
In	a	more	recent	work, Functional Beauty,	Glenn	Parsons	and	Allen	
Carlson	endorse	the	positive	condition:	“We	think	that	the	traditional	
notion	of	disinterestedness,	when	properly	interpreted,	is	well	found-
ed	and	necessary	for	an	acceptable	analysis	of	the	aesthetic”	(104).10 
8.	 I	assume	that	the	idea	of	a	merited	or	warranted	response	is	coherent,	though	
it	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	essay	to	go	into	detail	about	it.	For	some	help-
ful	discussion,	 see	 Justin	D’Arms	and	Daniel	 Jacobson,	 “The	Moralistic	Fal-
lacy:	On	the	‘Appropriateness’	of	Emotions”,	Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol.	61,	No.	1,	pp.	65–90,	July	2000.
9.	 See	his	book	Art, Frederick	A.	Stokes	Company	Publishers,	1914.
10. Functional Beauty,	Oxford	University	Press,	2008.
aesthetic	theory	and	art	criticism;	and	it	is	still	influential	today.	Levin-
son	writes	that	a	pleasure	is	aesthetic	if	it	is
…not	rooted	in	or	dependent	on	the	way	an	art	work	an-
swers	to	one’s	individual	desires,	needs,	or	worldly	proj-
ects.	 Put	 positively,	 for	 pleasure	 to	 be	 aesthetic	 it	must	
arise	 solely	 from	 contemplation	 of,	 attention	 to,	 or	 en-
gagement	with	the	object	for	its	own	sake,	on	the	part	of	
a	sympathetic	subject.7
This	passage	expresses	the	thought	that	aesthetic	affect	is	impartial,	in	
a	sense,	and	it	states	both	a	negative	and	a	positive	condition,	which	
we	can	express	as	follows:
 Disinterest-	:	 If	a	pleasure	in	an	item	is	aesthetic,	then	it	
is	not	due	to	the	way	the	item	satisfies	one’s	desires,	needs,	
or	worldly	projects.
 Disinterest+	:	 If	a	pleasure	in	an	item	is	aesthetic,	then	it	
is	due	to	sympathetic	attention	to,	or	contemplation	of,	the	
item	for	its	own	sake.
I	have	replaced	Levinson’s	terms	‘arises	solely	from’,	‘dependent	upon’,	
and	‘rooted	in’	with	‘due	to’.	This	effectively	replaces	several	ambigu-
ous	terms	with	one	ambiguous	term,	which,	like	the	others,	is	ambigu-
ous	between	a	causal	notion	and	a	normative	notion.	My	interest	 is	
primarily	 in	 the	normative	notion,	 in	 the	 idea	 that	a	pleasure	 is	aes-
thetic	only	if	 it	 is	warranted	or	merited	by	“sympathetic	attention	to”	
7.	 “Pleasure	and	the	Value	of	Works	of	Art”,	originally	in	British Journal of Aesthet-
ics,	Vol.	32,	No.	4,	pp.	295–306,	October	1992,	and	reprinted	in	Levinson’s	The 
Pleasures of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays,	Cornell	University	Press,	pp.15–6.	
There	are	many	expressions	of	such	a	view	in	the	literature.	Sometimes	the	
view	 is	 restricted	 to	 pleasure	 in	 artworks;	 sometimes	 artworks	 are	 treated	
more	as	paradigm	cases	of	objects	of	 aesthetic	 value;	 sometimes	artworks	
are	treated	more	as	convenient	examples	of	appropriate	objects	of	aesthetic	
pleasure.	Sometimes	it	is	unclear	whether	the	author	is	interested	in	aesthetic	
value	or	artistic	value.	I	am	treating	it	as	a	view	in	the	theory	of	beauty,	as	Kant	
does,	where	beauty	is	aesthetic	value	par excellence.
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idea	that	aesthetic	pleasure	depends	in	part	on	some	interests	or	affec-
tive	dispositions:
There	is	a	danger,	no	doubt,	in	taking	[disinterest]	too	far.	
For	 certainly	our	 satisfaction	 in	 an	artwork,	 even	when	
wholly	 focused	on	 the	object	 and	 its	 structure,	 causally	
presupposes	something	about	our	dispositions	and	affec-
tions	 and	 thus,	 in	 a	 sense,	 answers	 to	 them.	Art	moves	
human	beings,	after	all,	in	part	because	of	how	humans	
are.	But	 the	point	not	 to	 lose	 sight	of	 is	 that	where	 the	
psychological	conditions	required	for	an	artwork	to	elicit	
a	positive	response	are	such	as	are	common to all persons…
then	the	satisfaction	that	such	conditions	underpin	may	
still	qualify	as	disinterested	and	thus	aesthetic….12 
Levinson	 posits	 a	 relation	 between	 aesthetic	 affect	 and	 shared	 “dis-
positions	and	affections”.	But	 it’s	not	entirely	clear	what	Levinson	 is	
saying	about	this	relation,	nor	is	it	clear	what	he	thinks	supports	this	
extra	 condition.	He	 begins	 to	 state	 a	 sufficient	 condition:	 if	 certain	
“dispositions	and	affections”	are	shared	by	all,	then	the	response	they	
support	is	disinterested	and	therefore	aesthetic.	But	he	hedges	in	the	
consequent	by	stating	that	the	pleasure	such	conditions	underpin	may 
still	qualify	as	disinterested,	which	seems	to	convert	the	shared	“dispo-
sitions	and	affections”	into	a	necessary	condition.
The	sufficient	condition	is	implausible,	because	we	don’t	want	to	
say	that	all	shared	pleasures	are	aesthetic.	What	about	the	necessary	
condition?	Notice	that	Disinterest-	and	+,	taken	alone	or	together,	do 
not entail	 the	 necessary	 condition	 Levinson	 states	 in	 the	 above	 pas-
sage.	For	all	Disinterest-	and	+	say,	people	may	have	differing	war-
ranted	 responses.	 Disinterest-	 and	 +	 are	 compatible	 with	 the	 pos-
sibility	 that	aesthetic	pleasure	 is	merited	by	different	objects	 for	dif-
ferent	 people	—	that	 I	may	 respond	 one	way	 to	 something	 and	 you	
may	respond	differently,	or	perhaps	not	at	all.	In	other	words,	for	all	
12.	 “Pleasure	and	the	Value	of	Works	of	Art”,	p.	16,	last	emphasis	added.
And	aesthetic	pleasure,	on	their	view,	is	“pleasure	taken	in	perceptual	
appearance	for	its	own	sake…”	(104–05).
The	“traditional	notion”	 is	also	well	expressed	by	Kant,	 in	whose	
work	we	find	both	conditions.	Kant	writes,	“The	satisfaction	that	de-
termines	the	judgment	of	taste	is	without	any	interest”,	where	‘interest’	
is	 defined	 as	 “the	 satisfaction	 that	we	 combine	with	 the	 representa-
tion	of	 the	existence	of	an	object”.	Kant	holds	 that	when	we	feel	an	
interested	pleasure	we	represent	an	object’s	“existence”	and	relate	it	to	
our	faculty	of	desire. In	other	words,	we	regard	it	in	the	light	of	our	per-
sonal	“desires,	needs,	or	worldly	projects”.	So	if	we	feel	a	pleasure	in	
response,	then	we	feel	an	interested	pleasure	—	interested	because	the	
pleasure	purports	to	signal	some	fact	about	how	the	object	can	benefit	
us.	Kant	also	writes	that,	in	asking	whether	someone	finds	something	
beautiful,	“One	only	wants	to	know	whether	the	mere	representation	
of	 the	object	 is	 accompanied	with	 satisfaction	 in	me…”,	 thereby	 ex-
pressing	the	positive	condition.	He	continues,	“…however	indifferent	
I	might	be	with	regard	to	the	existence	of	the	object	of	this	representa-
tion”,	thereby	expressing	the	negative	condition.11
Sometimes	Kant	seems	to	have	in	mind	an	even	stronger	principle.	
For	example,	in	the	same	section,	he	writes,	“Everyone	must	admit	that	
a	judgment	about	beauty	in	which	there	is	mixed	the	least	interest	is	
very	partial	and	not	a	pure	 judgment	of	 taste.”	On	one	reading,	 this	
extends	 the	disinterest	 criterion	 from	a	 condition	on	 interest	 in	 the	
object	to	any	interest	at	all.	And	Levinson’s	statement	of	Disinterest+ 
might	 suggest	 that	 he	 agrees	with	 this,	 particularly	when	he	writes	
that	aesthetic	pleasure	must	arise	solely	 from	attention	 to	 the	object	
“for	its	own	sake”.	Such	language	suggests	that	the	subject	needn’t	do	
anything	but	dispassionately	stare	at	the	object,	bringing	nothing	of	
herself	to	the	table	but	awareness.	
Yet	Levinson	warns	against	such	strong	versions	of	disinterest.	Ac-
cording	to	Levinson,	we	should	not	think	that	disinterest	rules	out	the	
11.	 §2,	Analytic	of	the	Beautiful.
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to	capture	the	intrinsically	rewarding	but	not	necessarily	pleasing	ex-
periences	we	have	of	certain	valuable	works	of	art.	The	experience	of	
some	works	of	art	may	involve	enjoyment	of	a	capacity	to	challenge,	dis-
turb,	provoke,	or	excite	in	a	way	that	is	not	accurately	characterized	as	
“pleasing”.	Such	works	provoke	and	sustain	our	positive	interest	without	
necessarily	 giving	us	pleasure.	 I	might	 “enjoy”	Picasso’s	Guernica,	Nir-
vana’s	“Smells	Like	Teen	Spirit”,	or	Hitchcock’s	Vertigo	while	not	finding	
my	experience	of	these	works	particularly	pleasing.	Thus	the	focus	on	
pleasure	shifts	to	an	even	more	expansive	notion	of	enjoyment.13
This	has	the	effect	of	infusing	the	notion	of	disinterest	in	a	cloudy	
soup	 of	 “the	 aesthetic”,	 in	 which	 philosophers	 now	 include	 pretty	
much	any	reaction	we	have	to	anything,	so	long	as	we	are	attending	to	
its	form,	appearance,	or	design.14	This	extremely	broad	notion	of	“the	
aesthetic”	places	little	or	no	priority	on	beauty	in	particular	and	effec-
tively	realizes	J.L.	Austin’s	mid-century	wish	that	we	could	“forget	for	
a	while	about	the	beautiful	and	get	down	instead	to	the	dainty	and	the	
dumpy”.15	Instead	of	going	on	and	on	about	beauty,	philosophers	have	
focused	on	“the	dainty”	and	“the	dumpy”	—	that	is,	on	the	vast	range	
of	terms	we	use	to	discuss	and	evaluate	artworks	and	items	of	“taste”.
This	 all-inclusive,	 paradigmatically	 art-centered	 approach	 to	 aes-
thetics	has	given	us	a	much	broader	and	more	nuanced	understanding	
of	the	variety	of	aesthetic	and	artistic	value	and	the	relation	between	
these	values.16	But	one	of	its	effects	has	been	a	willful	neglect	of	beauty	
13.	 Discussion	of	this	point	can	be	found	in	Jerrold	Levinson’s	“Pleasure	and	the	
Value	of	Works	of	Art”	and	in	Malcolm	Budd’s	“Aesthetic	Essence,”	in	Aesthetic 
Essays,	Oxford	University	Press,	p.	45–6.
14.	 Here,	for	example,	is	Yuriko	Saito’s	definition	in	Everyday Aesthetics,	Oxford	
University	 Press,	 2007:	 “In	 the	 realm	of	 ‘the	 aesthetic’,	 I	 am	 including	 any	
reactions	we	form	toward	the	sensuous	and/or	design	qualities	of	any	object,	
phenomenon,	or	activity”	(p.	9).
15.	 J.L.	 Austin,	 “A	 Plea	 for	 Excuses”,	 in	 Philosophical Papers,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	1961,	p.	131.
16.	 For	 recent	 discussion,	 see	 Dominic	 McIver	 Lopes’s	 “The	 Myth	 of	 (Non-
Aesthetic)	Artistic	Value”,	 in	The Philosophical Quarterly,	Vol.	61,	No.	244,	pp.	
518–36,	2011.	See	also	 two	 responses:	Andrew	Huddleston,	 “In	Defense	of	
Artistic	Value”,	The Philosophical Quarterly,	Vol.	62,	No.	249,	pp.	705–14,	2012,	
Disinterest-	and	+	say,	the	features	of	persons	that	underlie	their	aes-
thetic	responses	might	not	be	shared,	and	so	there	is	a	need	to	defend	
the	view	that	shared	“dispositions	and	affections”	are	necessary.
This	raises	the	question	as	to	whether,	and	if	so	how,	aesthetic	af-
fect	can	(1)	be	due	to	sympathetic	attention	to	an	item,	and	(2)	not	be	
due	to	the	way	the	item	satisfies	our	“desires,	needs,	or	worldly	proj-
ects”,	yet	also	(3)	answer	to	features	of	our	sensibility	that	are	personal,	
idiosyncratic,	or	otherwise	less	than	universal	or	shared.	Call	this	the 
disinterest question.	To	answer	this	question	in	the	positive,	we	would	
have	to	show	that	aesthetic	affect	can	indeed	satisfy	Disinterest-	and	
+	while	nonetheless	being	due	to	features	of	sensibility	 that	are	 less	
than	universal.	To	answer	this	question	in	the	negative,	we	would	have	
to	show	that	whenever	Disinterest-	and	+	are	satisfied,	the	pleasure	
is	due	to	shared	features	of	sensibility.
My	aim	in	what	follows	is	to	show	that	consideration	of	the	disin-
terest	question	serves	to	undermine	the	emphasis	on	disinterest	in	the	
theory	of	beauty,	in	a	way	that	helps	to	illuminate	beauty’s	significance.	
I	adopt	two	strategies	to	meet	this	aim.	The	first	is	to	argue	that	a	nega-
tive	answer	to	this	question	is	implausible,	and	that	a	positive	answer	
counts	against	using	the	notion	of	disinterest	in	the	theory	of	beauty.	
A	second	strategy	is	to	show	that	even	if	beauty	does	require	a	sensibil-
ity	that	is	“common	to	all	persons”	—	that	is,	even	if	the	first	strategy	
fails	and	a	negative	answer	to	the	disinterest	question	is	correct	—	the	
emphasis	on	disinterest	is	at	best	misleading,	at	worst	misguided.	In	
other	words,	I	want	to	argue	that	the	requirement	of	shared	“disposi-
tions	and	affections”	is	not	enough	to	merit,	or	even	to	motivate,	the	
thought	that	beauty’s	affective	character	should	be	described	as	“dis-
interested”.	My	focus	in	pursuing	both	strategies	is	the	way	in	which	
beauty	can	have	a	kind	of	life-	or	self-transforming	import.
Both	 strategies	 are	promising	—	and	 I	will	 explain	why	 I	 think	 so	
shortly	—	but	it	is	worth	highlighting	how	far	they	are	from	the	lines	of	
thought	pursued	these	days.	For	many	philosophers	today,	the	empha-
sis	on	disinterested	pleasure	is	fine	as	far	as	it	goes,	but	it	doesn’t	go	far	
enough.	This	 is	because,	they	argue,	pleasure	is	too	narrow	a	notion	
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losopher’s	main	resource	in	the	theory	of	beauty	is	the	concept	of	dis-
interest,	then	“selflessness”	is	a	promising	way	to	explain	beauty’s	sig-
nificance.	If	we	think	of	the	self	as	partly	constituted	by	(at	least	some	
of)	our	desires,	then	our	sense	of	self	will	be	responsive	to	our	sense	of	
desire.	Schopenhauer	suggests	that	the	self	just	is	the	will,	so	if	“pure	
contemplation”	strips	away	our	desires,	or	somehow	places	us	“above”	
them,	then	we	will	be	left	with	no	sense	of	self,	or	even	a	sense	of	self-
lessness.	He	sounds	a	similar	thought	when	he	echoes	and	amplifies	
Disinterest+:
Perhaps	the	reason	why	common	objects	in	still life	seem	
so	transfigured	and	generally	everything	painted	appears	
in	a	supernatural	light	is	that	we	then	no	longer	look	at	
things	in	the	flux	of	time	and	in	the	connection	of	cause	
and	effect….	On	the	contrary,	we	are	snatched	out	of	that	
eternal	flux	of	all	things	and	removed	into	a	dead	and	si-
lent	eternity.	In	its	individuality	the	thing	itself	was	deter-
mined	by	time	and	by	the	conditions	of	the	understand-
ing;	here	we	see	this	connection	abolished	and	only	the	
Platonic Idea	is	left.19
This	suggests	that	there	really	is	something	extraordinary	about	beau-
ty	 that	 a	 theory	 needs	 to	 capture,	 that	 the	 affective	 notion	 that	 fea-
tures	in	the	theory,	whatever	it	is,	must	be	able	to	explain,	illuminate,	
or	 somehow	speak	 to	beauty’s	apparent	profundity,	however	 that	 is	
characterized.
Of	course,	few	philosophers	today	would	be	inclined	to	join	Scho-
penhauer	in	using	terms	like	‘supernatural’	or	 ‘Platonic	Idea’	to	char-
acterize	beauty’s	significance.	I	don’t	know	whether,	or	even	what	it	
means	to	say	that,	beauty	is	the	only	way	to	freedom,	or	that	contem-
plation	of	beauty	 is	ultimately	what	makes	 life	worth	 living.	A	deci-
sive	claim	against	any	attempt	to	make	sense	of	such	views	would	be	
that	no	one	really	connects	with	the	thought	that,	or	understands	how,	
19. Manuscript Remains,	Vol.	I,	§80.
in	particular,	as	though	it	were	just	another	one	of	the	aesthetic	prop-
erties	captured	by	the	inclusive	theories	—	at	best	the	object	of	disin-
terested	pleasure,	a	happy	modification	of	“enjoyment”,	or	a	vague	or	
archaic	way	of	talking	about	thin	aesthetic	or	artistic	value.17
But	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	the	mainstream	approach	to	thinking	
about	aesthetic	affect	could	explain	how	beauty	in	particular	could	be	
so	significant,	or	could	have	played	such	a	major	role	in	the	thinking	
of	past	philosophers.	Why	think	that	mere	enjoyment,	or	disinterested	
pleasure,	could	have	a	kind	of	spiritual	or	religious	 import,	be	what	
ultimately	makes	life	worth	living,	or	that	experiencing	such	pleasure	
could	be	the	only	path	to	freedom?	(I’m	assuming	we	aren’t	zealous	
hedonists	here.)	Even	 if	enjoyment	of	a	sort	 should	figure	 in	a	very	
general	account	of	the	aesthetic,	what	is	it	about	beauty	in	particular	
that	might	lead	one	to	place	it	at	such	heights?
The	 temptation	 to	 do	 so	 is	 strong	—	so	 strong	 that	 its	 effects	 are	
present	even	within	 the	 tradition	of	 emphasizing	disinterested	plea-
sure.	Disinterest	is	not	promoted	only	by	those	who	want	to	focus	on	
“earthbound”	 notions	 of	 beauty,	 or	who	 otherwise	want	 to	 take	 the	
wind	out	of	beauty’s	sails.	Some	philosophers	have	used	the	notion	of	
disinterested	pleasure	to	try	to	capture	the	thought	that	the	experience	
of	beauty	involves	self-transcendence,	purity	of	vision,	or,	even	more	
mysteriously,	experience	that	somehow	cannot	be	understood	in	the	
normal	terms	of	subject	and	object.
Schopenhauer,	 for	 example,	 takes	 Disinterest-	 to	 new	 heights	
when	he	writes	that	“…aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	consists,	to	
a	 large	extent,	 in	 the	 fact	 that,	when	we	enter	 the	state	of	pure	con-
templation,	we	 are	 raised	 for	 the	moment	 above	 all	 willing,	 above	
all	desires	and	cares;	we	are,	so	to	speak,	rid	of	ourselves”.18	 If	a	phi-
and	Louise	Hanson,	“The	Reality	of	(Non-Aesthetic)	Artistic	Value”,	The Philo-
sophical Quarterly,	Vol.	63,	No.	252,	pp.	492–508,	July	2013.
17.	 This	isn’t	to	say	that	no	one	talks	about	beauty,	or	that	this	attitude	toward	
beauty	 is	 entirely	unjustifiable.	The	past	 emphasis	on	beauty	 in	art	 theory,	
production,	and	criticism	had	a	pernicious	influence	and	was	worth	resisting.
18. The World as Will and Representation,	Vol.	I,	§68.
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him	like	a	shamed	secret,	an	image	that	was	ostensibly	
of	a	place,	but	which	was	actually	of	himself.	So	 it	was	
himself	 that	he	was	attempting	 to	define	as	he	worked	
on	his	study.	As	he	sanded	the	old	boards	for	his	book-
cases,	and	saw	the	surface	roughness	disappear,	the	gray	
weathering	flake	away	to	the	essential	wood	and	finally	
to	a	rich	purity	of	grain	and	texture	—	as	he	repaired	his	
furniture	and	arranged	it	in	the	room,	it	was	himself	that	
he	was	slowly	shaping,	it	was	himself	that	he	was	putting	
into	a	kind	of	order,	 it	was	himself	 that	he	was	making	
possible.	(p.	100–01)
Williams	seems	to	draw	a	connection	between	attending	to	the	way	
something	 looks	or	appears	and	“self-definition”	or	 “making	oneself	
possible”.	By	attending	to	the	look	of	the	study	as	he	arranges	it,	Ston-
er	seems	to	identify	with	a	certain	conception	of	himself	—	an	“image”	
somehow	reflected	in	the	emerging	study,	in	the	“rich	purity	of	grain	
and	texture”	of	the	wooden	bookcases.	This	self-conception	is	“osten-
sibly	of	a	place”	but	“actually	of	himself”	—	it	is	something	for	Stoner	to	
achieve	or	embody.	It	is	a	self-conception	that	represents	a	kind	of	per-
son	Stoner	wishes	to	be	or	knows	he	can	be,	but	currently	isn’t	—	it’s	
a	“place”	to	go,	but	Stoner	isn’t	yet	there.	It	is	a	kind	of	“ideal	self”	or	
positive	 self-conception	 that	was	 locked	within	him	 “like	 a	 shamed	
secret”,	and	somehow	reflected	in	the	character	of	the	study.
Stoner	is	attending	to	the	arrangement	of	furniture	and	its	“rich	pu-
rity	of	grain	and	texture”.	Richness	and	purity	are	paradigmatic	beau-
ties	—	often	 featuring	 in	our	 thought	and	 talk	about	beauty	—	and	at-
tending	to	the	way	a	room	looks	or	feels	is	a	characteristically	aesthetic	
activity.	Stoner’s	contemplation	of	the	aesthetic	character	of	the	room 
connects	him	with	a	way	of	understanding	and	valuing	himself,	one	
that	can	play	a	guiding	role	in	how	he	lives	and	understands	his	life. 
Marcel	Proust’s	In Search of Lost Time	contains	an	arguably	similar	il-
lustration	wherein	finding	something	beautiful	involves	an	awareness	
beauty	might	have	a	profound	dimension.	Perhaps	enjoyment	 is	 all	
there	really	is.	Perhaps	Levinson	is	right	that	beauty	is	not	as	rich	or	
profound	as	some	philosophers	have	made	it	out	to	be,	and	this	is	a	
fact	that,	in	one	way	or	another,	we	all	acknowledge.
But	I	think	this	isn’t	correct,	and	the	considerations	against	it	sup-
port,	in	turn,	both	strategies	for	resisting	the	emphasis	on	disinterest	
in	the	theory	of	beauty.	Although	beauty	may	not	have	delivered	on	
its	religious,	spiritual,	or	even	mystical	promise,	I	think	we	still	under-
stand	and	connect	with	at	least	one	way	in	which	it	has	a	kind	of	strong	
personal	import.	And	if	this	is	mischaracterized	or	cannot	be	captured	
by	the	running	views,	then	there	is	some	real	work	to	do	in	the	theory	
of	beauty,	the	least	of	which	is	an	overhaul	of	its	central	notion.
Twentieth-century	literature	contains	a	wealth	of	examples	where	
the	encounter	with	beauty	is	deeply	meaningful.	And	in	contrast	to	the	
tradition	of	emphasizing	disinterested	pleasure,	the	self	seems	to	be	
rather	involved	in	these	experiences,	not	diminished,	obscured,	or	ex-
cluded	—	indeed,	the	self	seems	essentially	to	be	clarified,	illuminated,	
transformed.	There	are	 two	ways	 in	which	 this	 seems	 to	occur,	and	
both	are	under-explored	in	aesthetics.	In	some	cases,	the	experience	
seems	to	bear	on	an	important	aspect	of	the	subject’s	individual	sense	
of	self,	in	a	way	that	supports	the	first	strategy	articulated	above	(ac-
cording	to	which	aesthetic	affect	can	indeed	satisfy	Disinterest-	and	+	
but	be	due	to	less-than-universal	features	of	a	person).	In	other	cases,	
the	experience	seems	to	bear	on	a	broader	evaluative	sense	of	the	sub-
ject’s	life	in	a	way	that	supports	both	the	first	and	the	second	strategy.
Consider	the	following	passage	from	John	Williams’s	novel	Stoner 
(1965),	which	tells	the	quiet	story	of	William	Stoner,	a	simple	man	and	
mediocre	English	professor.	Under	pressure	from	his	wife,	who	barely	
tolerates	him,	he	buys	a	house	he	can	barely	afford.	He	needs	a	study,	
so	he	decides	to	make	a	downstairs	room	his	own.
As	he	worked	on	the	room,	and	as	it	began	slowly	to	take	
a	 shape,	 he	 realized	 that	 for	many	 years,	 unknown	 to	
himself,	he	had	had	an	image	locked	somewhere	within	
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to	 leap	upwards	with	 it;	her	 lips	at	 the	 same	 time	curv-
ing	in	a	friendly	smile	for	the	worn	old	stones	of	which	
the	setting	sun	now	illumined	no	more	than	the	topmost	
pinnacles,	 which,	 at	 the	 point	where	 they	 entered	 that	
zone	of	sunlight	and	were	softened	and	sweetened	by	it,	
seemed	to	have	mounted	suddenly	far	higher,	to	have	be-
come	truly	remote,	like	a	song	whose	singer	breaks	into	
falsetto,	an	octave	above	the	accompanying	air.22
In	her	understated	way,	Bathilde	tries	to	explain	the	beauty	she	finds	
in	the	steeple.	It	embodies	“naturalness”	and	“distinction”,	which	are	
values	she	prizes	above	anything	else	 in	 the	world.	And	 they	aren’t	
just	values	she	appreciates	in	other	people;	Proust	makes	it	clear	that	
they	are	values	she	loves	and	seeks	out	in	herself.23	It	is	apparently	in	
virtue	of	her	finding	these	values	reflected	in	the	steeples	that	she	finds	
the	steeple	beautiful.	This	suggests	a	close	connection	between	Mar-
cel’s	grandmother	and	William	Stoner:	perhaps	Stoner	finds	values	he	
could	recognize	as	his	and	“prize	above	anything	else	 in	 the	world”,	
thereby	“defining”	the	kind	of	person	he	shall	be.
Proust	has	another	illustration	of	the	way	in	which	beauty	can	have	
a	profound	effect	on	us,	but	in	this	case	the	effect	seems	to	bear	more	
generally	on	the	subject’s	evaluative	sense	of	his	life.	In	Swann’s Way 
we	learn	of	Charles	Swann,	a	busy	if	somewhat	listless	Parisian	social-
ite.	One	day	at	a	party,	he	hears	a	beautiful	phrase	from	a	sonata	by	
the	(fictional)	composer	Vinteuil	and	is	struck	with	the	feeling	that	he	
must	change:
But	now,	like	a	confirmed	invalid	in	whom,	all	of	a	sud-
den,	a	change	of	air	and	surroundings,	or	a	new	course	
of	treatment,	or	sometimes	an	organic	change	in	himself,	
spontaneous	and	unaccountable,	seems	to	have	brought	
about	such	an	improvement	in	his	health	that	he	begins	
22. Swann’s Way,	p.	69.
23.	 Among	other	descriptions,	Proust	writes	of	Bathilde’s	“nobility	of	character”	
(p.	23),	“ardent	idealism”	(p.	41),	and	“generosity	and	moral	distinction”	(p.	45).
of	self-or	life-shaping	values.20	Bathilde	Amédée, the grandmother of the 
narrator (for convenience I’ll call him “Marcel”),	loves	the	beauty	of	the	
church	steeple	in	Combray	for	its	“naturalness”	and	“distinction”	—	val-
ues	she	“prizes	above	anything	else	in	the	world”:
Without	 quite	 knowing	 why,	 my	 grandmother	 found	
in	 the	 steeple	 of	 Saint-Hilaire	 that	 absence	 of	 vulgarity,	
pretension,	 and	 meanness	 which	 made	 her	 love	—	and	
deem	rich	in	beneficent	influences	—	nature	itself….	And	
certainly	every	part	one	saw	of	the	church	served	to	dis-
tinguish	the	whole	from	any	other	building	by	a	kind	of	
general	feeling	which	pervaded	it,	but	it	was	in	the	stee-
ple	that	the	church	seemed	to	display	a	consciousness	of	
itself,	to	affirm	its	individual	and	responsible	existence….
I	think,	 too,	 that	 in	a	confused	way	my	grandmother	
found	in	the	steeple	of	Combray	what	she	prized	above	
anything	else	in	the	world,	namely,	a	natural	air	and	an	
air	of	distinction.	Ignorant	of	architecture,	she	would	say:	
“My	dears,	 laugh	 at	me	 if	 you	 like;	 it	 is	 not	 convention-
ally	beautiful,	but	there	is	something	in	its	quaint	old	face	
which	pleases	me.	If	it	could	play	the	piano,	I	am	sure	it	
would	really	play.”21	And	when	she	gazed	on	it,	when	her	
eyes	followed	the	gentle	tension,	the	fervent	inclination	
of	its	stony	slopes	which	drew	together	as	they	rose,	like	
hands	 joined	 in	prayer,	 she	would	absorb	herself	 so	ut-
terly	in	the	outpouring	of	the	spire	that	her	gaze	seemed	
20.	I	use	a	few	examples	from	Proust,	whose	novel	In Search of Lost Time	is	full	of	
fascinating	and	subtle	descriptions	of	the	encounter	with	beauty.	I	agree	with	
Richard	Moran’s	suggestion	that	“it	should	be	beyond	question	that	Marcel	
Proust	 is	at	 least	as	decisive	a	 thinker	about	 the	nature	of	beauty	as	 is	 Im-
manuel	Kant”.	See	his	“Kant,	Proust,	and	the	Appeal	of	Beauty”,	Critical Inquiry,	
Vol.	38,	No.	2,	pp.	303–04,	Winter	2012.	All	citations	of	In Search of Lost Time 
are	from	Volume	1:	Swann’s Way	of	C.K.	Scott	Moncrieff	and	Terence	Kilmar-
tin’s	translation	of	À la recherche du temps perdu,	Random	House,	1981.
21.	 “Je	suis	sure	que	s’il	jouait	du	piano,	il	ne	jouerait	pas	sec.”
	 nick	riggle On the Interest in Beauty and Disinterest
philosophers’	imprint	 –		9		–	 vol.	16,	no.	9	(june	2016)
abides	and	shines.	Else	his	chest’s	bow
couldn’t	blind	you,	nor	could	such	a	slight
turn	of	his	waist	send	smiles	of	light
through	the	site	of	creation’s	growth.
Otherwise	this	stone	would	be	scarred	and	small	
under	the	shoulders’	diaphanous	fall
and	not	shimmer	like	the	coat	of	a	beast;
nor	burst	forth	from	all	his	boundaries	light
like	a	star:	there’s	not	a	place	in	the	least
that	does	not	see	you.	You	must	change	your	life.
The	poem	describes	a	rich	experience	of	a	sculpture,	a	description	in-
fused	with	the	metaphor	of	light	—	the	torso	“shines”,	“glows”,	“blinds”,	
emanates	light	“like	a	star”,	and	“shimmers”.26	And	if	it	were	somehow	
different,	it	wouldn’t	captivate:	it	would	be	“small”,	“diaphanous”,	“scar-
red”.	Yet	the	final	lines	mark	a	jarring	shift	in	address,	from	a	descrip-
tion	of	the	sculpture’s	radiance	to	its	apparent	acknowledgement	of	the	
viewer.	And	it	 is	this	acknowledgement	that	carries	a	profound	mes-
sage:	Change your life.	It	seems	that	Rilke’s	implied	subject	is	somehow	
presented,	like	Swann,	with	the	thought	of	a	“wholly	different	life”	—	a	
life	somehow	reflected	in	or	evoked	by	the	sculpture’s	radiance.
The	first	two	examples	suggest	that	aesthetic	experience	can	bear	
on	—	highlight,	define,	transform	—	our	sense	of	self,	whereas	the	last	
two	examples	suggest	that	it	can	bear	on	our	evaluative	sense	of	our	
lives,	in	such	a	way	that	our	life	may	seem	clearer,	more	valuable,	pre-
cious,	or	worth	cherishing	or	changing.	Sometimes	both	seem	to	occur.	
While	riding	in	the	back	of	a	carriage,	young	Marcel	spots	three	trees	
in	the	distance	(the	“trees	at	Hudimesnil”).	This	occasions	an	experi-
ence	 in	which	he	 feels	a	 remarkable	pleasure,	 the	understanding	of	
26.	 “glüht	noch	wie	ein	Kandelaber”,	“hält	und	glänzt”,	“der	Brust	dich	blenden”,	
“flimmerte”,	“Rändern	noch	wie	ein	Stern”.
to	envisage	 the	possibility,	hitherto	beyond	all	hope,	of	
starting	 to	 lead	belatedly	 a	wholly	different	 life,	 Swann	
found	in	himself,	in	the	memory	of	the	phrase	that	he	had	
heard,	in	certain	other	sonatas	which	he	had	made	people	
play	to	him	to	see	whether	he	might	not	perhaps	discover	
his	phrase	therein,	the	presence	of	one	of	those	invisible	
realities	in	which	he	had	ceased	to	believe	and	to	which,	
as	though	the	music	had	had	upon	the	moral	barrenness	
from	which	he	was	suffering	a	sort	of	recreative influence,	
he	was	conscious	once	again	of	the	desire	and	almost	the	
strength	to	consecrate	his	life.24
Before	hearing	 the	music,	 Swann	 is	 acting	on	his	usual	preferences	
and	values,	 but	his	 experience	of	 the	music	 alters	 these	values	 and	
gives	Swann	a	new	perspective	on	what	matters	to	him.	Swann	finds	
in	it	an	“invisible	reality”	whose	“recreative	influence”	gives	him	the	
desire	 to	 “consecrate	his	 life”.	 In	 the	Stoner passage,	attention	 to	 the	
character	of	the	room	is	associated	with	being	a	wholly	different	person,	
or	at	least	with	finally	defining	the	kind	of	person	he	is	or	aspires	to	be;	
in	the	passage	about	Swann,	aesthetic	experience	is	associated	with	
living	a	wholly	different	life.
A	similar	experience	is	arguably	captured	by	Rainer	Maria	Rilke’s	
famous	poem	about	an	experience	of	an	ancient	bust	of	Apollo:
Apollo’s Archaic Torso25
We	can’t	know	his	unheard-of	head,
with	eyes	like	ripening	apples.	Though
like	so	many	flames	his	torso	glows,
with	a	glare	that,	held	back	instead,
24. Ibid., pp.	229–30.
25.	 This	is	my	translation	of	the	German	“Archaischer	Torso	Apollos”.	 It	differs	
from	the	other	English	translations	that	I’m	aware	of	in	its	attempt	to	capture	
some	of	Rilke’s	meter	and	rhyme.	For	a	different	interpretation,	see	Stephen	
Mitchell’s	translation	in	The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke,	Vintage,	1989.
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in	the	objects	of	their	experience	—	an	aspect	that	they	seem	to	iden-
tify	with	while	recognizing	that	it	does	not	capture	the	kind	of	person	
they	currently	are	or	the	kind	of	life	they	currently	live.	They	don’t	re-
ally	live	up	to	a	way	they	have	of	thinking	about	who	they	are	or	what	
matters	in	their	lives.	In	grasping	the	self-	or	life-image,	they	seem	to	
construe	 themselves	as	beautiful	or	worthy	or	good	—	or	at	 least	po-
tentially	so.	In	his	short	story	“Pieces	of	Glass”,	John	Gould	describes	
a	similar	experience,	directed	at	a	painting.	His	character	is	drawn	to	
a	painting	he	encounters	at	a	gallery	opening	and	then,	upon	meeting	
the	artist	who	painted	it,	drawn	to	her.	He	buys	the	painting	that	night	
but	never	sees	the	artist	again.
I	haven’t	seen	her	since	that	night,	my	artist,	but	I	have	
the	painting	now	to	stare	at,	when	I’m	alone,	this	strange	
painting,	 this	oddly	shaped	shard	of	glass	 that	 takes	all	
my	staring	and	turns	it	around,	somehow,	reflects	it,	gives	
it	back	to	me,	almost	as	though	it	were	me,	as	though	I	
were	the	beautiful	one.27
Of	course,	these	are	literary	depictions,	which	is	to	acknowledge	that	
they	occur	 in	 largely	fictional	works.	But	 the	 important	point	 is	 that	
they	ring	true.	They	speak	to	our	sense	that	beauty	puts	us	in	touch	
with	not	just	something	extraordinary	in	the	world,	but	something	ex-
traordinary	in	ourselves.
The	analogous	thought	about	morality	 is	 familiar	enough.	Philos-
ophers	have	held,	and	many	continue	 to	hold,	 that	moral	 reflection	
and	action	put	us	in	touch	with	our	“true”,	“highest”,	or	most	estimable	
selves,	and	this	is	often	associated	with	aesthetic	experience.	Kant	fa-
mously	speaks	of	“the	moral	law	within”	in	terms	that	are	evocative	of	
the	sublime.	But	as	we	have	seen,	aesthetics	is	less	enthusiastic	about	
the	thought	that	the	experience	of	beauty	involves	self-transformation,	
enhancement,	or	elevation.	And	to	the	extent	that	theories	of	beauty	
27.	 John	 Gould,	 The Kingdom of Heaven: Eighty-Eight Palm-of-the-Hand Stories,	
Ekstasis	Editions,	1996,	p.	13.
which	he	thinks	could	help	him	live	a	“true	life”.	In	looking	at	the	trees	
in	the	distance,	he
…recognized	 that	 kind	 of	 pleasure	 which	 requires,	 it	
is	 true,	 a	 certain	 effort	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	mind,	 but	 in	
comparison	with	which	the	attractions	of	the	indolence	
which	 inclines	us	 to	 renounce	 that	pleasure	 seem	very	
slight.	 That	 pleasure,	 the	 object	 of	 which	 I	 could	 only	
dimly	feel,	which	I	must	create	for	myself,	I	experienced	
only	on	rare	occasions,	but	on	each	of	these	it	seemed	to	
me	that	the	things	that	had	happened	in	the	meantime	
were	of	little	importance,	and	that	in	attaching	myself	to	
the	reality	of	that	pleasure	alone	could	I	at	length	begin	
to	lead	a	true	life.	(771)
This	is	remarkably	similar	to	Swann’s	experience	of	the	Vinteuil	sonata	
and	to	Rilke’s	poem	about	the	sculpture.	But	shortly	thereafter,	Marcel	
describes	his	experience	as	potentially	providing	a	kind	of	self-under-
standing.	Proust	describes	the	trees	as	“telling”	Marcel	something,	as	
seeming	to	say	to	him:
What	you	fail	to	learn	from	us	today,	you	will	never	know.	
If	you	allow	us	to	drop	back	into	the	hollow	of	this	road	
from	 which	 we	 sought	 to	 raise	 ourselves	 up	 to	 you,	 a	
whole	part	of	yourself	which	we	were	bringing	to	you	will	
vanish	into	thin	air.	(773)
The	trees	present	Marcel	with	“a	whole	part	of	[him]self”,	 the	under-
standing	of	which	would	help	him	“begin	to	lead	a	true	life”.	He	loses	
sight	of	the	trees	before	he	has	fully	grasped	what	part	of	himself	that	
is,	and	feels,	as	a	result,	“as	wretched	as	if	[he]	had	just	lost	a	friend,	
had	died	to	[him]self…”	(773).
Each	passage	seems	to	involve	a	kind	of	self-	or	life-conception	con-
nected	to	the	subject’s	attention	to	the	way	something	looks,	sounds,	
or	appears.	The	subjects	seem	to	glimpse	some	aspect	of	themselves	
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the	kind	of	value	they	see	themselves	as	having	is	closely	connected	
to	the	kind	of	value	they	are	experiencing	the	world	as	having.	Beauty	
seems	 to	 introduce	 them	 to	 a	 state	 of	 valuing	 that	 is	 as	 directed	 at	
themselves	or	their	lives	as	it	is	at	the	world.
So	what	exactly	is	the	way	we	have	of	valuing	ourselves	or	our	lives	
that	beauty	can	connect	us	to?	What	aspect	of	ourselves	or	our	lives	
can	be	“reflected	in”	or	“hinted	at”	by	beauty?	What	is	beauty	such	that	
something	recognizable	as	“self”	can	feature	in	it?
Disinterest	theories	have	resources	to	provide	answers	to	these	dif-
ficult	questions,	but	the	answers	they	can	give	seem	incapable	of	fully	
capturing	 the	 phenomena.	 There	 are	 two	 general	 approaches	 a	 dis-
interest	theorist	might	take.	One	is	to	argue	that	self-awareness	—	es-
pecially	of	the	sort	that	might	result	in	a	transformative	sense	of	self-	
or	 life-worth	—	is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 experience	of	 beauty	 vis-à-vis	
disinterested	pleasure.	Another	is	to	agree	that	disinterested	pleasure	
somehow	involves	the	self,	but	only	a	self	that	we	all	share	—	a	univer-
sal,	rational,	or	moral	self.
Our	discussion	of	Schopenhauer	supplies	an	example	of	 the	first	
response,	which	tries	to	squeeze	beauty’s	significance	out	of	disinter-
ested	pleasure.	In	finding	something	beautiful	and	feeling	disinterest-
ed	pleasure,	we	become	aware	of	a	source	of	value	beyond	ourselves	
and	our	individual	interests.	Disinterested	pleasure	informs	us	of	the	
existence	of	something	we	need	to	conform	ourselves	to	in	some	way,	
perhaps	by	admiring	or	respecting	its	object,	and	so	can	play	a	role	in	
getting	us	to	see	ourselves	or	our	lives	in	a	different	way,	particularly	
as	guided	or	shaped	by	values	outside	of	ourselves.	The	full-blooded	
moral	insight	is	that	other	people	are	such	values.	In	this	way,	disinter-
ested	pleasure	is	a	kind	of	proto-moral	feeling.
Appealing	as	the	thought	may	be,	it	seems	inadequate	to	capture	
the	complexities	of	the	phenomena	depicted	in	our	literary	examples.	
The	 “ideal	 self”	 that	William	Stoner’s	experience	 involves	seems	per-
sonal	 and	 contentful —	it	 is	 not	 a	 general	 conception	of	 a	 kind	of	 be-
ing	 that	has	a	 certain	moral	 capacity.	 It	 is	an	 individual	or	personal,	
if	somewhat	vague,	conception	of	a	particular	kind	of	person	Stoner	
have	tried	to	articulate	it,	as	we	have	seen,	it	has	more	often	been	by	
claiming	 that	 beauty	 is	 incompatible	with	 or	 effaces	 our	 self-aware-
ness.	Yet	these	passages	suggest	quite	the	opposite.
Of	course,	philosophers	have	taken	an	interest	in	a	certain	way	in	
which	aesthetic	phenomena,	broadly	speaking,	can	engage	or	affect	
our	sense	of	self,	particularly	through	our	use	of	narrative	in	construct-
ing	a	self-	or	life-conception,	and	through	our	identification	with	char-
acters	 or	 events	 depicted	 in	 narrative	 artworks, e. g.,	 novels,	 poems,	
films,	 and	narrative	paintings.28	We	often	 imaginatively	adopt	differ-
ent	perspectives	when	we	engage	with	fictional	narratives,	empathize	
with	a	friend,	or	immerse	ourselves	in	an	actor’s	role,	and	doing	so	can	
give	us	a	new	perspective	on	our	lives	and	ourselves.
But	 our	 literary	 examples	 don’t	 fit	 this	model,	 precisely	 because	
they	are	so	narratively	sparse.	Stoner	is	arranging	a	room	and	appreci-
ating	the	“rich	purity	of	grain	and	texture”	of	the	bookshelves;	Marcel	
is	looking	at	trees	in	the	distance;	Swann	is	listening	to	a	snippet	of	
absolute	music.	The	closest	we	get	to	narrative	content	is	the	sculpture	
(Rilke)	and	the	artwork	(Gould).	But	Rilke’s	severely	damaged	ancient	
bust	 is	 an	 object	 of	metaphorical	 regard,	 and	Gould’s	 artwork	—	de-
scribed	as	a	“shard	of	glass”	—	is,	for	all	we	can	tell,	an	abstract	piece.	
It	 seems	 that	 the	 subjects	 are	 sympathetically	 attending	 to	 the	way	
something	looks,	sounds,	or	appears.
In	other	words,	it	seems	that	Disinterest+	is	satisfied	in	these	en-
counters.	But	we	want	to	say	that	they	aren’t	simply	contemplating	the	
way	something	looks.	These	encounters	seem	to	involve	access	to	a	
way	of	understanding	and	valuing	oneself	or	one’s	life.	We	might	say	
that	the	subjects	see	themselves	or	their	lives	as beautiful	in	the	beauty	
of	a	scene,	sound,	sculpture,	or	painting.	Their	experience	of	beauty	
seems	to	be	inseparable	from	an	awareness	of	their	own	value,	where	
28.	The	role	of	self-narrative	in	moral	psychology	and	ethics	has	been	the	topic	
of	much	recent	work.	See,	for	example,	Marya	Schechtman’s The Constitution 
of Selves, Cornell University Press, 1996, and her more recent Staying Alive: Personal 
Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life, Oxford	University	Press,	2014;	
see	also	Peter	Goldie’s	The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind,	Oxford	
University	Press,	2012.
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a	capacity	to	value	the	world	independently	of	whether	it	satisfies	our	
individual	desires	and	interests.	As	important	as	this	capacity	is,	it	is	
not	 clear	why	we	would	 regard	 such	 a	 capacity	 as	having	 aesthetic	
value	akin	to	beauty.	But	if	the	sense	of	self	is,	as	I’ve	suggested,	some-
thing	like	an	ideal,	then	we	can	see	more	clearly	why	we	might	asso-
ciate	it	with	beauty,	for	ideals	can	be	the	product	of	our	own	creative	
activity.	They	can	be	original,	unique,	intriguing,	and	exciting	in	ways	
that	artworks	can	be,	and	we	can	regard	them	as	structuring	and	giv-
ing	value	—	even	aesthetic	value	—	to	a	life.30
The	literary	examples	suggest	 that	self-awareness	of	some	sort	 is	
partly	constitutive of	the	affective	state	in	the	experience	of	beauty,	not	
simply	a	downstream	effect.	Thus,	the	second	response	a	disinterest	
theorist	might	adopt	is	to	argue	that	self-awareness	of	a	sort	is	indeed	
constitutive	of	the	experience	of	beauty,	but	the	self	we	are	aware	of	is	
one	we	all	share.	For	example,	consider	a	theory	that	states	that	beauty	
is	a	kind	of	order	or	harmony.	(It’s	hardly	worth	mentioning	that	such	
a	theory	is	hopeless,	but	for	our	purposes	the	particulars	don’t	matter.)	
By	reflecting	order	or	harmony,	beauty	puts	us	in	mind	of	our	highest,	
rational	selves.	Beauty,	then,	reflects	an	ideal	we	all	share	(or	should	
all	have).	The	pleasure	we	feel	as	a	result	is	indeed	responsive	to	our	
desire,	and	this	desire	is	indeed	partly	constitutive	of	our	sense	of	self,	
but	it’s	impersonal in	the	relevant	sense	—	it	isn’t	an	idiosyncratic	or	in-
dividualizing	desire.	It’s	one	that	we	all	(should)	have	and	all	(should)	
find	compelling,	and	so	it	is	one	that	figures	among	the	permitted	“dis-
positions	and	affections”	that	supposedly	underlie	aesthetic	affect.31
We	could	refine	and	generalize	the	view	in	various	ways,	but	the	
problem	a	disinterest	 theorist	 faces	 is	 that	 it	 plays	 into	 the	hand	of	
our	 two	 strategies	 against	 disinterest.	 Consider	 the	 second	 strategy,	
which	was	to	argue	that,	on	its	own,	the	requirement	of	a	common	or	
30.	In	my	paper	 “Ideals	as	Metaphors”	 (in	progress),	 I	develop	a	 theory	of	per-
sonal	 ideals	 according	 to	 which	 ideal	 self-conceptions	 are	 metaphorical	
self-conceptions.	 I	 contrast	 this	 view	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 are	 fictional	
self-conceptions.
31.	 Perhaps	St.	Augustine	had	a	view	like	this.
aspires	to	be.	Proust	seems	keenly	aware	of	this:	when	young	Marcel	
sees	the	trees	at	Hudimesnil,	he	regards	the	pleasure	he	feels	as	bring-
ing	to	him	“a	whole	part	of	[him]self”	the	grasp	of	which	would	enable	
him	to	lead	a	“true	life”.	But	the	pleasure	is	part	of,	or	a	response	to,	an	
awareness	or	 recognition	whose	content	 is	 too	vague	or	unclear	 for	
him	to	fully	grasp.	It	is	not	plausible	that	the	content	is	simply	that	he	
has	the	capacity	for	moral	reflection	—	a	capacity	that	Swann	and	Mar-
cel	are	already	aware	of	having.	Furthermore,	 consider	Swann,	who	
finds	 in	himself	 (and	 in	 “his”	music)	a	desire	 to	 “consecrate”	his	 life.	
As	 the	novel	makes	clear,	 this	does	not	mean	he	wants	 to	make	his	
life	more	moral	or	rational	—	he	wants	to	pursue	his	intellectual	and	
artistic	ideals.29
Another	problem	concerns	connecting	this	thought,	if	we	ultimate-
ly	should,	with	the	thought	that	beauty’s	significance	includes	finding	
ourselves	beautiful,	or	at	least	with	seeing	ourselves	as	having	a	kind	
of	aesthetic	value.	The	disinterest	theorist’s	first	response	says	that	the	
value	we	find	in	ourselves	is	a	kind	of	capacity	to	see	beyond	ourselves,	
29.	The	passage	that	immediately	precedes	the	one	I	quoted	illustrates	this:	“In-
deed	this	passion	 for	a	phrase	of	music	seemed,	 for	a	 time,	 to	open	up	be-
fore	Swann	the	possibility	of	a	sort	of	rejuvenation.	He	had	so	long	ceased	
to	direct	his	 life	towards	any	ideal	goal,	confining	himself	to	the	pursuit	of	
ephemeral	satisfactions,	that	he	had	come	to	believe,	without	ever	admitting	
it	to	himself	in	so	many	words,	that	he	would	remain	in	that	condition	for	the	
rest	of	his	days.	More	than	this,	since	his	mind	no	longer	entertained	any	lofty	
ideas,	he	had	ceased	to	believe	in	(although	he	could	not	have	expressly	de-
nied)	their	reality.	Thus	he	had	grown	into	the	habit	of	taking	refuge	in	trivial	
considerations,	which	enabled	him	to	disregard	matters	of	fundamental	im-
portance.	Just	as	he	never	stopped	to	ask	himself	whether	he	would	not	have	
done	better	by	not	going	into	society,	but	on	the	other	hand	knew	for	certain	
that	if	he	had	accepted	an	invitation	he	must	put	in	an	appearance,	and	that	
afterwards,	if	he	did	not	actually	call,	he	must	at	least	leave	cards	upon	his	
hostess,	so	in	his	conversation	he	took	care	never	to	express	with	any	warmth	
a	personal	opinion	about	anything,	but	 instead	would	supply	 facts	and	de-
tails	which	were	valid	enough	in	themselves	and	excused	him	from	showing	
his	real	capacities.	He	would	be	extremely	precise	about	the	recipe	for	a	dish,	
the	dates	of	a	painter’s	birth	and	death,	and	the	titles	of	his	works.	Sometimes,	
in	spite	of	himself,	he	would	let	himself	go	so	far	as	to	express	an	opinion	on	
a	work	of	art,	or	on	someone’s	interpretation	of	life,	but	then	he	would	cloak	
his	words	in	a	tone	of	irony,	as	though	he	did	not	altogether	associate	himself	
with	what	he	was	saying.”	(Swann’s Way,	p.	229)
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beauty’s	reflecting	such	personal values	or	ideals —	some,	like	“order”	(or	
“order-as-it-reflects-rationality”)	may	be	universal;	others	may	be	less	
than	universal.
Some	might	be	tempted	to	argue	that	our	interest	in	more	personal	
or	non-universal	ideals	is	among	the	“desires,	needs,	or	worldly	proj-
ects”	ruled	out	by	Disinterest-. But	that	is	precisely	what	our	literary	
examples	 count	 against.	Once	we	 admit	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 desire	 as	
partly	constitutive	of	beauty’s	affect,	what	 justifies	restricting	the	de-
sire	to	those	we	all	share,	particularly	in	the	face	of	the	examples	from	
Proust,	Williams,	and	Rilke	(among	others)?	It	is	common	ground	in	
the	theory	of	beauty	that	our	affective	response	cannot	be	a	response	
solely	to	the	object’s	particular	instrumental	value	or	to	how	the	sub-
ject	will	benefit	from	using	it.	Our	literary	examples	show	that	the	bur-
den	of	 proof	 is	 on	 those	who	want	 to	 strengthen	 the	 restriction	on	
“interest”	to	exclude	things	like	our	deeply	personal	interest	in	certain	
values,	ideals,	or	ways	of	life	that	we	may	find	reflected	in	a	scene,	per-
son,	or	thing.	And	if	no	one	is	really	willing	to	meet	that	burden,	or	if	
their	attempts	to	meet	it	fall	flat,	then	on	a	reasonable	understanding	
of	its	central	terms,	Disinterest-	is	also	satisfied	by	our	examples.
If	that’s	right,	then	we	have	arrived	at	a	positive	answer	to	the	disin-
terest	question,	namely,	whether	aesthetic	affect	can	be	(1)	due	to	sym-
pathetic	attention	to	the	item	for	its	own	sake,	(2)	not	due	to	the	way	
the	item	satisfies	our	“desires,	needs,	or	worldly	projects”,	yet	also	(3)	
due	to	“dispositions	and	affections”	that	are	less	than	universal.	This	
shows	that	the	requirement	of	shared	“dispositions	and	affections”	is	
not	entailed	by	Disinterest-	or	+.	And	if	that’s	right,	then	it	will	be	ex-
ceedingly	difficult	to	understand	why	philosophers	should	care	about	
the	concept	of	disinterest	in	the	theory	of	beauty,	apart	from	its	consid-
erable	historical	significance.
The	natural	alternative	is	to	focus	instead	on	the	special	kind	of	de-
sire	or	interest	beauty	elicits	and	engages	—	an	interest	or	desire	that	
is	attuned	to	both	the	world	and	the	person	living	in	the	world.	The	
discussion	suggests	 that	concepts	 like	 “self-definition”,	 “living	a	 true	
life”	or	“ideal-self”	would	do	better,	 if	only	as	reminders	of	where	to	
universal	sensibility	is	not	enough	to	merit,	or	even	to	motivate,	the	
thought	that	beauty’s	affective	character	should	be	described	as	“dis-
interested”.	Once	we	allow	a	constitutive	connection	between	beauty’s	
affect	and	a	sense	of	self,	however	universal,	 it	seems	misleading	at	
best	 to	describe	 the	affect	as	 “disinterested”.	Such	a	view	holds	 that	
our	experience	of	beauty	consists	in,	or	at	least	is	essentially	poised	to	
issue,	a	valuing	state	that	is	as	much	about	the	life	or	self	of	the	subject	
as	it	is	about	the	world	—	one	that	is	potentially	self-	or	life-transform-
ing.	The	challenge	is	to	understand	what	this	valuing	state	is,	and	if	we	
begin	by	describing	beauty’s	affective	character	as	disinterested,	then	
it	is	easy	to	see	how	we	might	veer	off	track,	or	end	up	calibrating	our	
theories	so	as	to	be	insensitive	to	any	thought	of	beauty’s	significance. 
(Furthermore,	at	the	core	of	our	theory	would	be	the	awkward	claim	
that	the	affective	character	of	the	experience	of	beauty	is	self-interest-
ed	but	disinterested.)
Now	consider	the	first	strategy,	which	was	to	argue	that	aesthetic	
affect	may	satisfy	Disinterest-	and	+	while	not	satisfying	the	extra	re-
quirement	that	it	be	grounded	in	shared	“dispositions	and	affections”.	
If	the	experience	of	beauty	involves	a	sense	of	self	or	life	that	we	re-
gard	as	valuable,	ideal,	or	otherwise	worth	embodying	or	living,	then	
why	restrict	the	relevant	sense	of	self	or	life	to	that	which	is	universal?	
Why	not	allow	for	a	plurality	of	ideals,	some	of	which	are	shared,	some	
of	which	are	not?	Marcel’s	 grandmother	 sees	 “naturalness”	 and	 “dis-
tinction”	in	the	steeple.	What	seems	to	warrant	her	response	is	in	part	
the	fact	that	she	prizes	these	above	anything	else	in	the	world,	at	least	
when	it	comes	to	the	way	she	lives	her	life.	She	allows	that	others	may	
not	value	them	as	she	does	and	so	may	not	find	the	steeples	beautiful	
as	 she	 does.	 Stoner	 seems	 similarly	 responsive	 to	 personal,	 or	 less-
than-universal,	 ideals	reflected	 in	his	study.	He	seems	responsive	to	
the	way	in	which	his	emerging	study	reflects	the	serene	and	austere	
life	of	a	certain	kind	of	professor.	It	seems	that	what	is	doing	much	of	
the	affective	work	in	these	cases	is	the	relation	the	subject	has	to	what	
she	finds	reflected	in	the	world;	she	sees	herself	in	the	beautiful	object	
by	seeing	her	ideals	reflected	there.	This	suggests	that	what	matters	is	
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strong	affinity	with	core	features	of	Kant’s	aesthetics.	But	this	doesn’t	
mean	we	should	follow	Kant	in	his	use	of	‘disinterest’.	Kant	describes	
as	 “disinterested”	 the	 feeling	we	 get	 upon	finding	 an	 aesthetic	 idea	
expressed	in	art	or	nature.	But,	at	least	on	one	way	of	thinking	about	it,	
this	primarily	serves	to	emphasize	that	pure	aesthetic	pleasure	is	not	
a	simple	pleasure	but	is	rationally	grounded,	in	part	in	the	“ideas”	we	
find	reflected	in	aesthetic	experience	and	in	our	capacity	to	find	them	
there.	It’s	more	important,	and	less	misleading,	to	emphasize	the	ratio-
nal	grounds	of	a	certain	kind	of	aesthetic	emotion	—	grounds	we	can	
partly	locate	in	its	representational	content.32
The	general	thought	that	beauty	is	the	object	of	an	emotion	has	a	
long	history	 in	the	particular	view	that	“love”	of	a	sort,	not	pleasure,	
should	 be	 the	 central	 affective	 notion	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 beauty.	 The	
thought	 is	 almost	 as	 old	 as	 philosophy	 itself	 (and	 lyric	 poetry)	 but	
could	still	be	explored	and	developed	further.33	If	the	considerations	
raised	here	are	right,	then	doing	so	promises	to	give	us	a	clearer	view	
of	the	kind	of	value	beauty	is	and	may	even	illuminate	an	important	
and	under-appreciated	way	in	which	aesthetic	value	interacts	with	a	
kind	of	ethical	value.	That	would	be	a	pretty	satisfying	result,	at	least	
for	this	fanatic.34
32.	 Thanks	 to	 the	 anonymous	 referee	 who	 encouraged	me	 to	 include	 a	 note	
about	Kant	and	aesthetic	ideas.
33.	 I	begin	to	take	up	this	project	in	my	forthcoming	paper	“Aesthetic	Love”,	in 
Art & Philosophy: New Essays at the Intersection,	ed.	Christy	Mag	Uidhir,	Oxford	
University	Press.	For	a	healthy	dose	of	the	tradition,	see	Plato’s	Symposium;	
Burke’s	 A Philosophical Enquiry;	 Mary	 Mothersill’s	 Beauty Restored, Adams,	
Banister,	and	Cox,	1984 (especially	chapter	9);	Alexander	Nehamas’s	Only a 
Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art,	Princeton	University	
Press,	2007;	and	Richard	Moran’s	“Kant,	Proust,	and	the	Appeal	of	Beauty”.	I	
briefly	discuss	 this	 tradition	 in	an	encyclopedia	entry	entitled	 “Beauty	and	
Love”,	in	Oxford’s	Encyclopedia of Aesthetics,	ed.	Michael	Kelly,	2014.
34.	 Thanks	 to	Paul	Boghossian,	Robert	Hopkins,	Andrew	Huddleston,	Richard	
Moran,	and	two	anonymous	referees.	Special	thanks	to	Béatrice	Longuenesse	
for	many	valuable	discussions	about	Proust,	Kant,	and	beauty.	And	special	
thanks	to	J.	David	Velleman,	who	initially	encouraged	me	to	develop	these	
ideas.
set	our	sights	in	developing	a	theory	of	beauty,	than	“self-dissolution”,	
“universal	self”,	or	“disinterest”.
Perhaps	we	 are	misled	 at	 the	 very	 first	 step,	when	we	 begin	 by	
thinking	of	the	paradigm	of	aesthetic	affect	as	a	kind	of	pleasure.	Plea-
sure	alone,	or	even	the	desire	for	it,	does	not	help	to	carve	out	an	es-
pecially	interesting	or	substantial	self.	And	those	pleasures	that	do	are	
often	symptoms	or	expressions	of	a	more	substantial	self-constituting	
or	self-defining	desire	or	commitment.	Perhaps	we	would	do	better	to	
think	of	aesthetic	affect	as	a	kind	of	emotion	—	a	state	that,	like	most	
pleasures,	 is	affective	and	 intentional,	but,	unlike	pleasure,	contains	
a	complex	evaluative	representation,	one	that	is	sensitive	to	the	indi-
vidual	whose	emotion	it	is.
Understanding	this	emotion	requires	much	more	work,	but	it	will	
help	to	get	clearer	on	its	representational	content.	I	think	Proust	can	
continue	to	guide	us,	but	perhaps	surprisingly,	I	also	think	Kant	—	the	
towering	advocate	of	disinterest	—	can	be	a	guide	and	can	help	us	ap-
preciate	the	role	that	a	concept	like	“disinterest”	plays	in	a	theory	of	
beauty.	Without	going	into	too	much	detail	here:	Kant	held	that	beauty	
is	the	expression	or	presentation	of	“aesthetic	ideas”.	An	aesthetic	idea	
is	“a	representation	of	the	imagination	that	occasions	much	thinking,	
though	 without	 it	 being	 possible	 for	 any	 determinate	 thought,	 i. e.,	
concept,	to	be	adequate	to	it”	(§49,	314).	Aesthetic	ideas	are	sensible	
counterparts	of	 “rational	 ideas”,	or	 ideas	 that	have	no	adequate	 intu-
ition.	Some	of	Kant’s	examples	of	rational	ideas	are	God,	freedom,	love,	
and	death,	but	he	would	presumably	include	ideals	of	various	sorts,	at	
least	insofar	as	an	ideal	is	something	that	cannot	be	fully	realized,	and	
so	cannot	be	the	object	of	an	intuition.	Furthermore,	Kant	writes	that	
“…taste	is	at	bottom	a	faculty	for	the	judging	of	the	sensible	rendering	
of	moral	ideas…”	(5:356),	which	suggests	that	moral	ideas	are	the	most	
(if	not	the	only)	aesthetically	relevant	rational	ideas.	If	we	think	of	a	
moral	idea	as,	roughly,	a	rational	idea	about	how	to	live	one’s	life,	then	
moral	ideas	are	much	like	personal	ideals.
It	 would	 seem,	 then,	 that	 the	 view	 of	 beauty	 I	 am	 suggesting	
here	—	roughly,	 beauty	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 personal	 ideals	—	has	 a	
